



THE JUNTA'S 100-DAY-PEACE PLAN TALKING PEACE WHILE WAGING WAR IN KAWTHOOLEI

Data for this report was collected between 21 April and 31 July 2026, and has been verified by the Karen Worldwide Advocacy Network (KWAN).

This briefing paper provides evidence of how the Burmese military is using talk of peace as a public relations charm offensive with the international community, whilst at the same time continuing to wage war and violate internal law.

MILITARY OPERATIONS WITHIN 100 DAYS IN KAWTHOOLEI

Attacks in Kawthoolei

1,851

Incidents

137

Injured

54


Killed

407

Buildings
Damaged

Type of Attacks

Aerial Attacks 65%



Artillery Shelling 30%



Shooting 2%



Others 3%



Buildings Damaged



7



9



14



4




373


MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KAWTHOOLEI

Between April 21 and July 31, 2026, the Burma military conducted indiscriminate attacks across Kawthoolei.


Number of Incidents



Number Buildings Damaged



Casualties



Number of People Killed

Gender



26




18

Note: This data includes only records with identified gender.

Age

Under 18	:11	20-59 Yrs	:20
60+ Years	:6	Unknown	:17

AERIAL AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS




TYPES OF AERIAL ATTACKS USED IN KAWTHOOLEI

Types of Aerial Attacks

Y-12	Drone	Jet Fighter	Paramotor
725	264	190	12
Gyrocopter	Kamikaze drone		
10	10		

Breakdown of Aerial Attacks



TYPES OF AIRCRAFT USED IN ATTACKS

Aircraft Types

**Jet
Fighters**



**Low-Cost
Ultralight Craft**



**Transport
Utility Planes**



Aircraft Types

Jet Fighters

MIG-29 and Yak-130 aircraft execute high-speed bombing runs.

**Transport
Utility Planes**

Y-12 aircraft are used for bombing runs and troop resupply.

**Low-Cost
Ultralight Craft**

Motorized paragliders (paramotors) and gyrocopters conduct slow, low-altitude drops of unguided explosives.

TYPES OF WEAPONS USED IN ATTACKS

Weapon Types

Heavy Bombs



Explosive Projectiles & Mortars



Machine Gun Fire



Weapon Types

Heavy Bombs

500-pound unguided general-purpose bombs dropped from jets.

Explosive Projectiles & Mortars

Aerial-dropped or ground-directed 60mm and 120mm mortar shells.

Machine Gun Fire

Heavy aircraft-mounted machine guns strafe villages and roads.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than five years after the coup in Burma on 1 February 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing declared himself the president on 3 April 2026 after a sham election, which did not meet any international standards of credibility for being free or fair. A few weeks later, on 20 April, the junta claimed it had a '100-Day Plan' for peace, economic recovery, and infrastructure modernization, and invited armed groups to talk regarding further negotiations.

During the 100-day peace plan, in Kawthoolei, the Burmese military carried out more than 18 attacks a day on average.

These indiscriminate attacks, likely constituting war crimes under international law, left 54 civilians dead, 137 injured, and more than 400 buildings destroyed.

The Burmese military is now continuing to talk peace whilst waging war. It held a Karen State Peace and Development Forum during 27-28 September 2026 in Hpa-An, the capital of the Burmese military occupied parts of Kawthoolei, which they call Karen State.

For many decades, the Burmese military has used sham peace processes as a tool for public relations, divide and rule tactics, and as a means of expanding their territorial control. None of the many peace plans initiated by the Burmese military have led to any long term sustainable political settlement that will bring long term peace. That was never their intention.

The Burmese military is aware of the political power of declaring a peace process. Who is against peace? Those not joining or expressing scepticism can easily be branded as being against peace, and obstacles to peace, when in fact what they want is a genuine and sustainable peace.

Karen Worldwide Advocacy Network is concerned that as the Burmese military tries to initiate yet another sham peace process, the international community will repeat past mistakes and support a peace process designed not for peace, but to prolong military rule.

The Burmese military is and always has been the aggressor. They initiated violence against ethnic nationalities and minorities and religious minorities long before the 1962 military coup.

We want real peace that will guarantee rights and autonomy for our people. If the Burmese military is serious about peace, they must stop all the attacks against our people and our land. They must withdraw from our lands. And they must face accountability for their international crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

In Kawthoolei, the Karen Worldwide Advocacy Network (KWAN) has documented intensified military operations affecting civilian populations through airstrikes, artillery bombardments, and ground raids, resulting in the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and further displacement. According to KWAN's monitoring over the 100-day period from 21 April to 31 July, a total of 1,851 incidents were recorded comprising 1,211 aerial attacks, 551 artillery strikes, and 89 ground assaults that included shooting at villagers, landmine incidents, and cases of capture and torture. The type of weapons used included fighter jets, transport planes, and low-cost ultralight aircraft to drop heavy bombs and cluster munitions, alongside machine gun fire and mortar shelling. These indiscriminate attacks left 54 civilians dead, 137 injured, and more than 400 buildings destroyed.

Over the 100-day period, Dooplaya district recorded a surge in attacks at 859 incidents, as the Burma Army moved to recapture its bases and tighten control over scam compounds in the area. Although Mutraw district recorded the greatest damage to buildings, the highest casualty tolls were in Taw Oo, Kler Lwee Htoo and Dooplaya districts. The increase in military attacks aimed at civilians exposes the hollowness of the regime's peace promises.

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Escalation of Airstrikes and Artillery Attacks

One of the most serious violations that remains insufficiently addressed in international reporting and advocacy is the systematic aerial bombing of civilians and public infrastructure by the Burma Army. Thousands of airstrikes, including by drones, paramotors, and gyrocopters and artillery attacks have targeted civilians and public infrastructure in Kawthoolei. During the regime's "100-day peace plan", KWAN documented 1,762 aerial and artillery attacks on public areas, resulting in numerous civilian casualties and extensive destruction of critical infrastructure, including schools, hospitals/clinics, and religious sites.

Targeting of Civilians and Vulnerable Groups

There have been repeated and deliberate attacks on villages suspected of supporting resistance groups. These attacks have included mass arrests, summary executions, and the burning of homes. Displaced women and women living in junta-controlled areas also face threats of arrest and interrogation. In May 2026, the Burma Army burned down three villages in the Mutraw district, destroying around 100 houses. KWAN also documented that more than 8,000 households were forced to flee their homes because of the military's scorched-earth tactics.

Expansion of Military Operations

In its attempts to regain the large swathes of territory lost to the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and allied resistance forces since the 2021 coup, the Burma Army has launched coordinated offensives in multiple regions, often combining ground assaults with airstrikes and artillery attacks. These operations have displaced tens of thousands of civilians, disrupted local economies, and destroyed hundreds of infrastructure sites, including schools, health facilities, and places of worship. During the 100-day plan alone, more than 400 buildings were destroyed.

Displacement Crisis and Humanitarian Blockades

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has surged, with hundreds of thousands fleeing active conflict zones. The blocking of relief efforts and the continued weaponization of aid by the regime have further isolated affected populations and deepened their vulnerability. In Kawthoolei alone, more than 1.2 million people are currently displaced.

The Burma Army continues to block aid delivery, worsening food insecurity and limiting access to medical care. This has also made menstrual hygiene more difficult for women because of the lack of sanitary pads and clean facilities. In addition, the military junta has repeatedly confiscated life-saving aid intended for local communities while targeting first responders.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AND GAPS

The crisis in Burma has received little attention from Western governments because it has been overshadowed by other foreign policy priorities. Their response has primarily focused on targeted sanctions and humanitarian aid led by UN mechanisms.

The vast majority of international aid goes to areas under the control of the Burmese military despite the majority of people in urgent need of lifesaving assistance being in areas not under Burmese military control. This is not in line with basic humanitarian principles and cannot continue to be justified. There must be a substantial increase in international aid directly to trusted local administrations, community-based, and cross-border organisations with the access and networks to reach affected communities.

China has remained a key backer of the regime, sustaining engagement with the authorities that control state institutions. The junta depends heavily on Beijing for economic support, including investments under the Belt and Road Initiative such as oil and gas pipelines. These projects have faced local resistance, particularly from communities displaced by land acquisition. In a joint statement of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, it was stated that “The Chinese side welcomes the general election in Myanmar and reaffirms its support for the efforts of the Myanmar side in advancing sustainable peace, stability, and development in the country.”

Russia's cooperation with the Burma Army has evolved into a lucrative defence partnership. The junta became the first foreign export customer for Russia's Mi-38T assault-transport helicopters, and Moscow has provided sustained diplomatic backing and strategic cooperation across multiple agreements. In early 2026, a five-year military cooperation agreement was signed, underscoring continued support despite international criticism.

ASEAN still refers to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which calls for an end to violence, dialogue, humanitarian aid, a special envoy, and access to all stakeholders. However, ASEAN has not set clear, measurable benchmarks or deadlines to compel the junta to comply, nor imposed consequences for non-compliance. This has allowed the military to ignore or selectively interpret the 5PC while continuing violence.

Although the 5PC commits ASEAN to providing humanitarian assistance, aid delivery is constrained by junta controls, travel restrictions, and limited access to conflict-affected areas, especially in ethnic regions like Kawthoolei.

Some ASEAN statements and national foreign ministries, notably the Philippines as 2026 Chair, have been criticized by rights groups for echoing or validating language from the junta's 100-day plan. High-level engagement with the junta-appointed foreign minister grants political recognition and allows the Burma Army to present itself as a legitimate governing authority, even while it continues attacks on civilians and public infrastructure.

Min Aung Hlaing's official visits to several ASEAN member countries in recent months have been used to boost the legitimacy of his regime, particularly his visit to Thailand in August, where he received an honour guard welcome and concluded several bilateral agreements. This was a shocking betrayal by the Thai government of the aspirations of the people of Burma for genuine democracy and peace.

CONCLUSION

There is a very real danger that the international community, tired of what they see as a conflict with no end and distracted by international crises in Europe and the Middle East, will opt to go along with yet another sham peace process and sham reform process for their own political convenience, trying to argue that something is better than nothing.

At the same time, most regional countries have made little or no effort to engage with or understand how the complex web of local administrations being built across Burma where people are free from Burmese military occupation presents a potentially more stable option than Burmese military rule ever has.

Growing engagement with the military junta by international and regional actors is deeply concerning as it will likely help prolong military rule and therefore mean more conflict, instability and human rights violations, including violations of international law. Domestic pathways for accountability do not exist, making access to justice impossible. The Burmese military regime must be rejected. The priority for engagement should instead support pro-democracy actors and ethnic administrations working toward a future free from military rule and grounded in lasting, meaningful peace.

The Burmese military has been given a breathing space with no new sanctions for almost two years, despite growing human rights violations. They do not produce their own jet fuel, fighter jets, or sophisticated weapons. These are imported. Without international supply chains, its airstrikes would not be possible at this scale. This means that governments, companies, and international actors who continue to allow the transfer of aviation fuel and military equipment are directly or indirectly, enabling the regime to carry out attacks against civilians. These actions may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

There has been no justice or accountability, reinforcing military impunity and enabling the regime to continue its systematic human rights abuses. The absence of accountability and transparency has allowed Burma's generals to systematically violate civilian rights, leaving communities living in persistent fear and uncertainty. The deteriorating human rights situation in Kawthoolei and across Burma requires urgent international action, including strong condemnation, meaningful intervention, and a refusal to recognise the junta as a legitimate or credible governing authority.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ASEAN

- **ASEAN must recognise that Burmese military rule never has and never will benefit the region.** ASEAN should refrain from normalising or granting official legitimacy to the military regime. Most ASEAN members face negative impacts as a result of the Burmese military, and need to reevaluate their entire approach.
- **ASEAN members should step up engagement with local administrations and civil society networks.** The bottom-up democratisation happening on the ground in Burma is unfamiliar to the international community, used to models of single leaders, parties or regimes. However, centralisation has never worked in Burma and this new approach has the potential to bring more stability and peace to Burma than Burmese military rule has.

- **ASEAN member states should establish and enforce a coordinated regional embargo on Burma's military regime** prohibiting the transfer, transit, financing, servicing, and technical support of military aircraft, helicopters, engines, spare parts, targeting systems, maintenance services, and aviation fuel where there is a substantial risk of military use. The embargo should include robust end-use monitoring, clear penalties for violations, and narrowly defined exemptions for legitimate civilian and humanitarian aviation, subject to independent verification.
- **ASEAN member states should reiterate and support the calls from CBOs/CSOs for increased cross-border humanitarian aid** through existing structures, which are already effective, but lack sufficient financial resources.

The international community is urged to

- **Not engage with or support yet another sham peace process launched and controlled by the Burmese military.** Governments must educate themselves about the decades' long history of how the Burmese military have used fake peace processes and initiatives to alleviate domestic and international pressure and expand their power and control.
- **Conduct independent reviews of how and why hundreds of millions of dollars in international aid was spent on a fake peace process between 2011 and 2021.** There were so many warning signs that the Burmese military were not genuine about the process and that it would never lead to a long-term political settlement leading to peace. Why were they missed or ignored. A refusal to accept that past mistakes were made makes future mistakes more likely.

- **Resume targeted sanctions on sources of revenue, arms and equipment to the Burmese military.** On 29th October 2026 it will be two years since the UK and EU brought in any new sanctions against the Burmese military. The last Canadian sanctions against the Burmese military were 7th March 2025. The last US sanction against the Burmese military was 6th January 2025. The last Australian sanctions were 1st February 2024. For sanctions to be effective they need to be imposed on a systematic ongoing basis. This is not happening, enabling the Burmese military to access revenue and arms which they are using to target and kill civilians.
- **Introduce sectoral sanctions and third country sanctions.** Sanctions on Burmese military companies, crony companies supplying them, and military controlled state-owned enterprises are welcome and should be significantly expanded, but these steps alone are not enough. The continued involvement of American and European companies in Burma's gas sector highlights the need for sanctions to go beyond Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and instead sanction the entire oil and gas extraction sector. Similarly, sanctioning the jet fuel sector in Burma, rather than only targeting domestic companies involved in supplying the military with jet fuel, is a necessary step to reduce jet fuel reaching the Burmese military. Sanctions against companies in third countries which are supplying the Burmese military with arms and equipment should also be considered.
- **Expand independent, locally led humanitarian assistance, and scale up cross-border aid,** to ensure it reaches the maximum number of conflict-affected communities, enabling them to access essential food, healthcare, education, and protection services, without benefiting the regime or being obstructed by the regime. This should be achieved by using ethnic existing structures and departments to deliver emergency cross-border aid to IDPs in a low-profile manner.