


INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY THE BURMA ARMY IN KAWTHOOLEI

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026

THE BURMA ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN KAWTHOOLEI

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026




THE BURMA ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN KAWTHOOLEI

July - September 2026

ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE

BURMESE MILITARY JUNTA'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS JULY – SEPTEMBER 2026



Between July and September 2026, the Burmese military junta conducted 1771 indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and buildings in Kawthoolei.

IDPS
1.1 MILLION


ATTACKS
1771

KILLED
29

INJURED
72

BUILDINGS DAMAGED
332

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026




The indiscriminate attacks by the Burmese military junta in Kawthoolei killed 29 civilians, injured 72, and damaged 332 buildings.


THE BURMA ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN KAWTHOOLEI

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026

ALL FORMS OF VOILENCE BY DISTRICT



CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY DISTRICT




From July to September 2026, the Burmese military junta carried out indiscriminate aerial and artillery attacks in Kawthoolei, causing the highest levels of casualties in Kler Lwee Htoo, Doo Tha Htoo and Mutraw districts.

THE BURMA ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN KAWTHOOLEI

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026

PEOPLE KILLED IN ATTACKS

Gender




Age

Under 18 : 8	19-59 Yrs : 14
60+ Yrs : 3	Unknown : 4

PEOPLE INJURED IN ATTACKS

Gender




Age

Under 18 : 21	19-59 Yrs : 40
60+ Yrs : 4	Unknown : 7


THE BURMA ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN KAWTHOOLEI

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2026


TYPE OF ATTACKS



TYPE OF BOMBS/SHELLS



INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE BY DISTRICT



SCHOOLS:	11
CLINICS:	0
MONASTERIES:	7
CHURCHES:	3
HOUSES:	311

Over the past three months, the military junta has intensified operations across Kawthoolei, using airstrikes, artillery, and ground assaults that have killed and injured civilians, destroyed homes and infrastructure, and forced further displacement.

Between July and September 2026, the Karen Peace Support Network has documented around 1,771 attacks, killing 29 civilians, injuring 72, and damaging 332 buildings. The repeated targeting of civilian infrastructure is intended to weaken community resilience, undermine KNU governance and public administration, and demonstrate that KNU-controlled areas cannot provide security or essential services.

The worst-affected districts were Mutraw (Hpapun) and Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin). The military's heavy reliance on artillery shelling and aerial attacks reflects a strategy to compensate for battlefield setbacks, prevent resistance forces from consolidating territorial control, secure border trade and military supply routes, reinforce remaining outposts, and strengthen its leverage in any future political negotiations.

Meanwhile, the Burma Army is now continuing to talk peace whilst waging war. It held a Karen State Peace and Development Forum during 27-28 September 2026 in Hpa-An, the capital of the Burma Army-occupied parts of Kawthoolei, which they call Karen State.

For many decades, the Burma Army has used sham peace processes as a tool for public relations, divide and rule tactics, and as a means of expanding their territorial control. None of the many peace plans initiated by the Burma Army have led to any long term sustainable political settlement that will bring long term peace. That was never their intention.

The Burma Army is aware of the political power of declaring a peace process. Who is against peace? Those not joining or expressing scepticism can easily be branded as being against peace, and obstacles to peace, when in fact what they want is a genuine and sustainable peace.

The Burma Army is and always has been the aggressor. They initiated violence against ethnic nationalities and religious minorities long before the 1962 military coup.

We want real peace that will guarantee rights and autonomy for our people. If the Burma Army is serious about peace, they must stop all the attacks against our people and our land. They must withdraw from our lands. And they must face accountability for their international crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- ASEAN member states should establish and enforce a coordinated regional embargo on Burma's military regime prohibiting the transfer, transit, financing, servicing, and technical support of military aircraft, helicopters, engines, spare parts, targeting systems, maintenance services, and aviation fuel where there is a substantial risk of military use. The embargo should include robust end-use monitoring, clear penalties for violations, and narrowly defined exemptions for legitimate civilian and humanitarian aviation, subject to independent verification.

- ASEAN member states should reiterate and support the calls from CBOs/CSOs for increased cross-border humanitarian aid through existing structures, which are already effective, but lack sufficient financial resources.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS URGED TO:

- Not engage with or support yet another sham peace process launched and controlled by the Burma Army. Governments must educate themselves about the decades-long history of how the Burma Army has used fake peace processes and initiatives to alleviate domestic and international pressure and expand their power and control.

- Resume targeted sanctions on sources of revenue, arms and equipment to the Burma Army. On 29th October 2026 it will be two years since the UK and EU brought in any new sanctions against the Burma Army. The last Canadian sanctions against the Burma Army were on 7th March 2025. The last US sanctions against the Burma Army were on 6th January 2025. The last Australian sanctions were on 1st February 2024. For sanctions to be effective they need to be imposed on a systematic ongoing basis. This is not happening, enabling the Burma Army to access revenue and arms which they are using to target and kill civilians.

- Expand independent, locally led humanitarian assistance, and scale up cross-border aid, to ensure it reaches the maximum number of conflict-affected communities, enabling them to access essential food, healthcare, education, and protection services, without benefiting the regime or being obstructed by the regime. This should be achieved by using existing ethnic structures and departments to deliver emergency cross-border aid to IDPs in a low-profile manner.